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Political Decision-Making and the Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping* 
 
Abstract: This article explores the reasons behind Canada’s declining participation in 
United Nations peacekeeping operations. It proposes a decision-making model that 
explains how politicians assess opportunities to commit personnel to peacekeeping 
missions by balancing their policy objectives with the pressures of electoral politics. 
Emphasizing the importance of voters in political decision-making processes, it argues 
that participation in peacekeeping is dependent on three key factors: a belief in the 
value of peacekeeping in principle; a belief in the value of a given peacekeeping 
operation; and risk aversion in response to the potential costs of peacekeeping. Tracing 
Canada’s declining participation in peacekeeping operations since the 1990s, it 
particularly focuses on how this calculus has, in different ways, limited Canada’s 
involvement in peacekeeping under Stephen Harper’s Conservative government and 
Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government, arguing that the former undervalued 
peacekeeping as a means of obtaining its foreign policy objectives and as a feature of 
national identity, minimizing the perceived benefits of participation, while the latter 
has focused on the inherent risks of peacekeeping despite a professed commitment to 
peacekeeping in principle, maximizing the perceived costs of further personnel 
commitments. The decisions of successive Canadian governments have led to a free-
rider problem in which Canada is willing to enjoy the benefits of peacekeeping but 
unwilling to bear the costs. 
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Peacekeeping has long been seen as a central feature of Canadian foreign policy and 
national identity.1 Rooted in the dominance of Pearsonian idealism over the country’s approach to 
foreign affairs throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, Canada’s history of engagement 
in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations reflects a broader commitment to multilateralism 
and liberal internationalism and has allowed it, as middle power with limited military capabilities, 
to exert an outsized influence on the global stage. While this history has been mythologized and 
the apparent altruism that it captures downplays the extent to which it has been fuelled by the 
pursuit of self-interest (Carroll 2016, and Wagner 2006/2007), peacekeeping nevertheless has a 
unique resonance in Canadian political life and has traditionally enjoyed a broad degree of popular 
support among the Canadian public (Anker 2005, and Martin and Fortmann 1995). 
Yet Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations has long been in decline. 
According to data collected by the International Peace Institute (IPI), from a peak of 3,222 troops 
deployed in April 1993, Canada’s commitment had fallen to 193 by the end of the century and just 
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14 in December 2017 (International Peace Institute, nd.).2 Different datasets provided by the 
Department of National Defence and the UN suggest that total Canadian personnel contributions 
hit an all-time low in February 2018 (Brewster 2018c). While the Liberal government has vowed 
to re-engage in UN peacekeeping operations and restore Canada’s support for multilateralism, its 
concrete commitments, as explored below, have been limited. Canada’s turn away from UN 
peacekeeping reflects a broader trend among Western democracies, which increasingly favour 
more hybrid missions and operations outside of the UN’s authority to traditional forms of 
peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams 2009). This represents a significant shift in the historical 
evolution of UN peacekeeping operations that deserves further attention.   
As a public good that is dependent on private provision by UN member states, 
peacekeeping is subject to a classic collective action problem (Olson 1965) as states have the 
incentive to free ride on others by enjoying its benefits without contributing to its costs. This results 
in unequal burden sharing and the sub-optimal supply of peacekeepers, both of which are rendered 
particularly acute as Western democracies scale back their commitments.3 The idea that Canada is 
a free-rider in global affairs is not new. In September 2015, The Economist described Canada as 
“[s]trong, proud and free-riding”, contrasting the country’s self-image as a responsible and 
generous global citizen with the reality of limited spending on foreign aid and defence. The issue 
of free riding on the security guarantees and military leadership of the United States has been one 
of the most central and contentious concerns of Canadian foreign policy throughout the country’s 
modern history, and has recently returned to prominence due to the public statements of U.S. 
Presidents Donald Trump and Barack Obama.4 Nevertheless, the notion that Canada is a free-rider 
in international peacekeeping efforts sharply contradicts traditional perceptions of Canadian 
foreign policy. But is it accurate? If so, how can the dramatic shift from global leadership to free 
riding be explained? And what barriers are in place to prevent a return to peacekeeping?  
Answering these questions requires a fundamental understanding of the factors that 
influence states’ participation in international peacekeeping operations. Because participation in 
peacekeeping is, at its core, an issue concerning the private supply of a public good, it is necessary 
to disaggregate state behaviour and focus on the supply-side constraints that influence key 
decision-makers over time. In Canada and other modern democracies, the decision of whether to 
participate in peacekeeping is made by elected officials who are subject to the incentives of 
electoral competition. The domestic political considerations that shape participation are therefore 
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considerable. This article explores the impact of these considerations and the ways in which they 
interact with and shape politicians’ ideological commitments and foreign policy goals. In doing 
so, it seeks to restore domestic politics to the centre of the analysis of international peacekeeping 
operations, and, more broadly, international relations theory (Fearon 1998). By placing politicians 
and voters at the centre of its analysis, it also expands on the distinction between the apparent 
disposition of a state towards peacekeeping and the decisions that policymakers make about 
participating in peacekeeping operations (Bellamy and Williams 2013), highlighting the degree to 
which these can conflict and how and why the specific pressures and incentives politicians face 
are of paramount importance to understanding the historical evolution of national peacekeeping 
participation. 
Politicians are not often forthcoming about their decision-making processes. As a result, 
these remain largely opaque to external observers. Still, political science theory offers valuable 
insights into the behaviour of elected officials and the unique demands imposed on them by 
democratic politics, making it possible to develop theories about political decision-making that 
can be used to explain available historical evidence. This article engages in such a task by 
proposing a decision-making model to explain Canada’s declining involvement in UN 
peacekeeping operations. It argues that politicians’ decisions to participate in peacekeeping are 
dependent on three key factors: a commitment to peacekeeping in general as a valuable public 
good in the international system; a commitment to a given peacekeeping mission in response to 
the potential specific benefits of participation; and risk aversion in the face of the potential costs 
participation entails. Focusing on the Conservative government of Stephen Harper and the Liberal 
government of Justin Trudeau, it explores how a combination of these factors can, in different 
ways, explain the failure of either to make meaningful participation commitments despite 
contrasting publicly articulated views on peacekeeping and foreign policy more generally. For the 
Harper government, it contends, the lack of participation can be explained by the absence of an 
ideological commitment to peacekeeping and electoral incentives to encourage participation; for 
the Liberal government, limited commitments are caused by a risk aversion that is fed by public 
opinion. As a result of the decisions of policymakers in successive governments, Canada has 
become a free-rider in UN peacekeeping operations that is willing to enjoy the benefits of 
peacekeeping but unwilling to bear the costs.  
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The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The first reviews current 
literature on peacekeeping participation, focusing on work that emphasizes supply-side factors to 
explain when, why and how states choose to participate in international peacekeeping operations. 
The second proposes a model based on the interests and behaviours of politicians and voters that 
explains the decision-making process Canadian policymakers engage in when assessing 
participation in UN peacekeeping missions. This model is then employed in the third section to 
explain Canada’s declining involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, with a focus on Stephen 
Harper’s Conservative government and Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government. Conclusions are 
then offered about Canada’s future involvement in peacekeeping and the possibility for 
overcoming free riding.  
 
Participation in International Peacekeeping Operations 
Current literature offers a wide variety of explanations for why states participate in 
international peacekeeping operations (for an overview, see: Bellamy and Williams 2012, and 
Bellamy and Williams eds. 2013). One of the most notable arguments that can be found in early 
work on the topic is that democratic states are more likely than their non-democratic counterparts 
to engage in peacekeeping (Andersson 2000, Andersson 2002, Daniel and Caraher 2006, and 
Lebovic 2004). The normative and institutionalist underpinnings of this claim reflect the emphasis 
on the shared values, interests and political decision-making processes of liberal democratic states 
by proponents of the democratic peace theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Dolye 2005, Maoz 
and Russett 1993, and Owen 1994). An explanation that focuses on regime type, however, fails to 
explain different levels of participation between democratic states and why participation by 
individual states can fluctuate over time, and fails to enquire into the extent to which participation 
by democratic states may be a function of historically contingent power relations, alliances and 
shared interests. Its value is therefore limited.  
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for peacekeeping participation can be found in the 
changing demand for finite military and humanitarian resources. States must prioritize where and 
how their troops are deployed at any given time, and commitments to certain operations, and to 
certain theatres, can come at the expense of others. An increase in the demand for troop 
commitments to non-UN missions would therefore have a negative impact on UN peacekeeping 
participation. According to this reasoning, the involvement of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) 
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in the War in Afghanistan is a fundamental cause of the decline of Canadian participation in UN 
peacekeeping missions (Badescu 2010). It is possible to view later participation in international 
coalitions in Libya and in Iraq and Syria in a similar way. While this demand-side focus usefully 
places peacekeeping participation within a broader international and security context, it 
nevertheless has two important shortcomings. First, establishing direct causality can be difficult. 
Canada’s military commitments in Afghanistan, which were particularly significant from 2006 to 
2011, did not precipitate a sudden disengagement from UN peacekeeping operations, nor did the 
end of the country’s combat mission or the ultimate withdrawal of Canadian soldiers from 
Afghanistan return it to the forefront of UN peacekeeping participation. Second, and crucially, 
how politicians respond to competing troop demands is, fundamentally, a choice. It is precisely 
how and why these choices are made that merits further analysis.  
More promising explanations for participation in peacekeeping can be found in the analysis 
of the institutional decision-making environments of specific states. The use of case study work is 
particularly illustrative. Exploring Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping 
operations, Libben (2017) argues that decision-making is shaped by the prevailing national 
strategic culture that reflects dominant views of the purpose of the country’s military. Conflicting 
and evolving views of Canada as an isolationist, as a Pearsonian internationalist and as a robust 
Western ally, he claims, are key to understanding fluctuations in the country’s troop contributions. 
Karlsrud and Osland (2016) similarly focus on strategic culture to explain Norway’s declining 
personnel commitments to peacekeeping operations and the institutional environment in which 
political decision-making occurs, highlighting the significance of the country’s increasing 
involvement with NATO, the reduction of the size of the Norwegian Armed Forces, fewer interests 
in the UN’s recent missions in Africa and the impact of past failures. The importance of prevailing 
security doctrines is also highlighted by Sotomayor Velázquez (2010) to explain varying degrees 
of participation by Latin American states, as is the degree of alignment between foreign and 
defence policies.  
Understanding peacekeeping as a public good that relies on private provision usefully shifts 
the emphasis to exploring the potential benefits that peacekeeping participation entails. Several 
authors have placed self-interest at the centre of their supply-side explanations of peacekeeping 
participation, a focus that is particularly useful for considering the decision-making processes of 
elected officials. Bove and Elia (2011) find that at the domestic level participation is facilitated by 
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the number and remuneration of military personnel and constrained by casualty tolerance and other 
military commitments, while at the international level it is primarily influenced by the level of 
threat that the target conflict poses, a state’s geographic proximity to the conflict and the number 
of persons that the conflict has displaced. Peacekeeping can also be used to pursue strategic foreign 
policy objectives. National interest is, of course, a primary determinant of foreign policy, and it 
has been argued that peacekeeping is no exception. Neack (1995) claims that peacekeeping has 
been dominated by states with an interest in preserving the status quo in the international system, 
while others offer the more critical view that peacekeeping represents a form of liberal imperialism 
that covers the flaws of the global political economy (Pugh 2004). States also participate in 
peacekeeping missions with their allies, illustrating the significance of shared foreign policy 
preferences (Ward and Dorussen 2016). Participation can also be driven by more basic concerns. 
Most obviously, contributing troops to a peacekeeping mission offers concrete financial rewards 
as governments are reimbursed at a rate of over US$1,332 per soldier per month (United Nations 
Peacekeeping, nd.(a)), providing an incentive for some states—particularly those that are low-
income—to contribute troops as a form of budgetary support (Gaibulloev et al. 2015). These 
financial incentives can play an important role in combatting free riding, a problem that becomes 
increasingly acute, Passmore, Shannon and Hart (2018) argue, as the number of contributors 
increases.   
While each of these strands of enquiry offers valuable insights into the forces that shape 
peacekeeping participation, several key questions remain unanswered. How does domestic 
politics—a force that is often at the heart of the democratic peace thesis—influence politicians’ 
decision-making processes about participation? To what extent are changing levels of commitment 
to international peacekeeping operations driven by electoral politics and the interests and actions 
of voters? And what implications do the unique demands of democratic politics have for the supply 
of peacekeeping as a public good? The remainder of this paper explores these questions by 
examining Canada’s gradual but marked turn away from UN peacekeeping under two governments 
that illustrate starkly different reasons for non-participation. To understand these reasons, it is first 
necessary to outline a model that captures the pressures and incentives of politicians’ decision-
making processes. It is to this task that the following section turns.  
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Political Decision-Making and Peacekeeping Participation 
In democratic states with civilian control of the military, decisions concerning the use of 
force are made directly by elected officials.5 These decisions are subject to significant resource 
constraints that take two forms: first, personnel constraints arising from the limited size of armed 
forces; and second, financial constraints imposed by limited budgets.6 A state can only engage in 
a finite number of military operations at any given time, and existing demands on personnel and 
finances can limit the size, number and nature of further deployments. Again, however, how and 
why these finite resources are used is not predetermined, but subject to political decision-making 
processes. 
In making policy decisions, politicians behaving rationally weigh the potential benefits and 
costs of each option, responding, ceteris paribus, positively to the former and negatively to the 
latter. Politicians have two primary interests. First, they desire to implement a set of policy 
objectives and, more generally, work towards a conception of the collective good, however broadly 
or narrowly defined, that is informed by their ideology, background, beliefs, biases and 
socioeconomic position. Second, politicians aim to win re-election, both for themselves and for 
the political party to which they belong. These electoral interests suggest that voters can play a 
considerable role in decision-making processes, as voters should be able, in theory, to take 
advantage the electoral pressure they are able to exert to influence politicians to undertake desired 
policy actions. If politicians do not respond, voters can simply demonstrate their dissatisfaction at 
the ballot box by voting incumbents out of office and replacing them with more like-minded or 
amenable representatives. The degree to which a democratic country engages in peacekeeping, 
then, should depend a great deal on the degree to which its voters desire it to do so.  
There are four reasons why this is not necessarily the case, each of which is well established 
in modern political science theory:  
 
1. Voters have diverse preferences. Acting rationally on these preferences is unlikely 
to lead to a consensus of public opinion on foreign policy issues.  
2. Voters often do not prioritize peacekeeping or foreign policy more generally in their 
electoral choices. Support for a particular political party and/or candidate may 
therefore not represent an endorsement of a stated foreign policy platform.7  
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3. Voters have significant informational constraints, a problem that is particularly 
acute in the realm of foreign policy as even the most ardent followers of national 
politics do not have access to classified diplomatic, military and intelligence 
information. This makes voters reliant on politicians for accurate and reliable 
information, creating a principal-agent problem with asymmetric information in 
which the interests of politicians diverge from the interests of voters.8  
4. Voters do not always behave rationally. Rather than defining and acting upon 
consistent and informed preferences, voters often support political parties and 
candidates based on partisan affiliations or shared identities (Achen and Bartles 
2016). In doing so, they fail to respond to the actions of politicians or act in a way 
that effectively communicates their interests.  
 
What conclusions can therefore be drawn about the incentives and constraints that 
politicians face when deciding whether to participate in UN peacekeeping operations? First, if 
voters either have diverse preferences or do not communicate consistent preferences through their 
electoral choices, politicians are able to pursue their foreign policy objectives as long as they are 
able to rely on a supportive—or at least non-oppositional—electoral constituency. Second, voters 
are unlikely to reward politicians for participating in peacekeeping or, alternatively, punish them 
for failing to do so. Indeed, given their informational constraints and low prioritization of foreign 
policy, voters may be oblivious to changes in peacekeeping participation that are not subject to 
national debate or widespread media coverage. Third, when voters lack a strong collective 
commitment to peacekeeping, the potential benefits of participation are outweighed by the 
potential costs. While voters may not reward politicians for participating in peacekeeping, they 
may punish politicians if participation entails an unacceptable number of causalities. For 
politicians who must balance their policy and electoral interests, participation in peacekeeping is, 
in the context of domestic politics, therefore a high-risk, low-reward activity.  
Taken together, these conclusions suggest that participation in peacekeeping is only 
rational when three conditions are met: when politicians hold a commitment to peacekeeping in 
general; when politicians hold a commitment to a given peacekeeping mission; and when 
politicians have a low risk aversion when faced with potential losses. Each of these conditions 
reflects a crucial factor in political decision-making surrounding peacekeeping participation:  
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Factor 1: Commitment to Peacekeeping in General 
The commitment to peacekeeping in general reflects a principled stance on the value of 
peacekeeping as a public good in the international system. Such a position stems from a broader 
ideological commitment to liberal internationalism and a belief that a country can best pursue its 
interests and exert its influence through engagement with multilateral institutions and the rules-
based international order. It can also reflect a view of peacekeeping as central to national identity 
following real or imagined historical participation patterns, or, more prosaically, an assessment of 
the apparent successes of past UN peacekeeping missions. 
 
Factor 2: Commitment to a Given Peacekeeping Mission 
The commitment to a specific peacekeeping mission is tied to judgements about the target 
conflict and the possible benefits of participation. It stems from both concrete concerns about 
national interest, geographic proximity and historical and cultural ties (Bove and Elia 2011, and 
Neack 1995) as well as an assessment of the marginal utility of participation based on whether 
committing troops would further ensure the success of the mission, particularly given the unique 
capabilities the state is able to contribute. The commitment to a given mission is also influenced 
by the actions of others as states can be induced to participate by allies (Ward and Dorussen 2016) 
or incentivized to free ride on other countries’ commitments (Passmore, Shannon and Hart 2018).  
 
Factor 3: Risk Aversion 
The significance of risk aversion in decision-making processes surrounding peacekeeping 
participation should not be underestimated. Indeed, the risk or reality of casualties has long been 
central to the supply of peacekeepers, particularly among wealthy democracies. The deaths of 18 
American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 tied to United Nations Operation in Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II) led to a broader withdrawal of the United States from peacekeeping and, with 
Presidential Decision Directive 25, the policy that participation in peacekeeping operations should 
be aligned with national interests (The White House 1994). Similarly, Belgium withdrew from the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) following the deaths of ten of its 
soldiers in April 1994, precipitating a major reduction in the size of the UN mission and fatally 
undermining its capacity and ability to pursue its mandate. The failures of UNOSOM II greatly 
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influenced the decision by member states to effectively abandon UNAMIR (Lewis 1994). As 
missions become increasingly complex and centred on enforcing rather than merely maintaining 
peace, the impact of risk aversion on troop contributions is likely to continue to grow.9  
The deaths of 159 Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 may seem to 
suggest that risk aversion is not a significant factor in the decision-making processes of Canadian 
politicians. While the impact of casualties on public support for the War in Afghanistan is debated 
(Boucher 2010, and Massie 2008), there are reasons to resist applying apparent lessons from the 
conflict to peacekeeping operations. Although he casualty tolerance of voters in peacekeeping 
operations deserves further attention,10 it has in other conflicts been shown to be influenced by the 
likelihood of success and initial support for the use of force (Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007). For 
peacekeeping operations in which, for the public, vital interests are not at stake and objectives are 
unclear or unattainable, casualty tolerance is likely to be lower than it is in other military 
engagements. Furthermore, as explored below, peacekeeping can be a highly partisan issue, 
undermining popular support and increasing risk aversion as a result.  
The probability of participation in international peacekeeping drops dramatically as the 
risk of casualties grows, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. This risk aversion, as shown in Figure 2, 
can lead to a shortfall in the aggregate supply of peacekeepers: 
 
Figures 1 and 2: Peacekeeping, Casualty Tolerance and Risk Aversion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PP              S(P) 
 
 
 
 
 
       R(C)      R(C) 
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The probability of peacekeeping participation (PP) declines sharply as the risk of casualties (R(C)) 
increases, as illustrated in Figure 1 (above left). This risk aversion can, in the absence of greater 
participation incentives, lead to a shortfall (solid line) in the aggregate supply of peacekeepers (S(P)) 
below optimal levels (dotted line), as illustrated in Figure 2 (above right).  
 
The decision of whether to participate in international peacekeeping operations involves two steps. 
The first is binary as officials can choose to either accept or decline to commit troops to a given 
peacekeeping mission. The second exists on a broad continuum as the decision to commit troops 
is followed by further decisions surrounding the size and nature of commitment. Politicians 
therefore have three options surrounding peacekeeping participation: to decline commitment and 
forego participation; to make a token commitment and provide limited and largely superficial 
support;11 or to make a meaningful commitment that will have a qualitative impact on the capacity 
and likelihood of success of a mission. Each of these outcomes can be tied to the three factors that 
influence participation outlined above, as illustrated in the simplified model presented in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3: Political Decision-making and Participation Outcomes 
 
Peacekeeping Valuable 
 
 
                           No         Yes 
 
 
 
                         Mission Valuable 
 
 
                          No                   Yes 
 
     
                         Risk Aversion 
 
 
                High      Low 
 
 
 
            Decline          Token              Meaningful 
          Commitment    Commitment             Commitment 
 
If politicians do not view peacekeeping in general as valuable, they will likely decline 
commitment. Similarly, if they view peacekeeping in general as valuable but do not view a given 
mission as valuable, they will likely either decline or make a token commitment. A token 
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commitment also logically follows when politicians view both peacekeeping in general and a given 
mission as valuable but are reluctant to make a meaningful commitment due to the risk of incurring 
casualties. It is only when politicians are committed to peacekeeping in general, committed to a 
given peacekeeping mission and unaffected by risk aversion that they will make the rational 
decision to meaningfully commit to participation. These three conditions, as the following section 
shows, are not easily met.  
 
Political Change and Peacekeeping Participation: From Stephen Harper to Justin Trudeau 
The political decision-making model presented above emphasizes the importance of the 
commitment to peacekeeping in general, the commitment to a given peacekeeping mission and 
risk aversion arising from casualty tolerance as central to determining peacekeeping participation. 
Each of these factors has, in different ways, limited participation in international peacekeeping 
operations under Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau as the former undervalued peacekeeping as a 
public good while the latter has been constrained by the perceived costs of further peacekeeping 
commitments. Each is explored below.  
 
Stephen Harper and the Politics of Disengagement 
Stephen Harper’s time as Prime Minister marked a historic shift in Canadian foreign policy. 
Abandoning the broad consensus around liberal internationalism that had defined Canada’s place 
on the international stage for more than half a century, his Conservative government sought to 
reorient Canadian foreign policy around the promotion—at least ostensibly—of supposedly 
traditional national values, including democracy, open markets and human rights, and the co-
operation with Western allies over multilateralism.12 It was a Manichean foreign policy infused 
with ideologically conservative politics and mixed, at times, with domestic political 
considerations. Both, to varying degrees, can be recognized in the Harper government’s signature 
foreign policy actions: the continued involvement in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan and 
later involvement in largely Western coalitions undertaking military actions in Libya and Iraq and 
Syria; the vocal support for the governments of Israel and Ukraine and opposition to the 
government of Iran; the professed commitment to the protection of religious minorities; the 
promotion of the production and export of Canadian oil to the global market; the withdrawal from 
international agreements, most notably the Kyoto Protocol; and, beyond its failed bid for a Security 
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Council seat in 2010, the broad disengagement from the United Nations. As leader of the 
opposition in 2003, Harper also famously supported Canada’s involvement in the Iraq War, writing 
with Stockwell Day in The Wall Street Journal that it was a mistake for Canada, a country “forged 
in large part by war”, to abandon its traditional American and British allies and its historic 
willingness to use force “for freedom, for democracy, [and] for civilization itself.”13 
The Conservative Party’s foreign policy principles were outlined in each of its election 
manifestos in 2006, 2008 and 2011. Its 2006 and 2008 platforms outlined a “Canada First” 
approach to national defence (2006, p. 45, and 2008, p. 29), with the former pledging that the party 
would “[a]rticulate Canada’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
free markets, and free trade – and compassion for the less fortunate” (Conservative Party of Canada 
2006, p. 45). Highlighting the intersection between its foreign policy priorities and its conception 
of national identity, the party’s 2011 manifesto pledged to ensure Canada is prepared for present 
and future security challenges, to assert “national sovereignty” and to “promote our nation’s 
history and foster Canadian patriotism.” (p. 33). This is a version of Canadian history in which 
militarism looms large and peacekeeping is conspicuous in its absence.14 The Conservative Party 
omitted any reference to peacekeeping in its 2006, 2008 and 2011 election platforms, and instead 
focused on promises to strengthen the CAF for combat missions, most notably in Afghanistan and 
more broadly in the context of the War on Terror, to assert territorial sovereignty and to promote 
Canada’s values abroad (Conservative Party of Canada 2006, p. 44-45, 2008, p. 29-30, and 2011, 
p. 31-43).15 The Liberal Party, in contrast, incorporated a commitment to peacekeeping in each of 
its platforms during the same period, declaring its intention to expand the CAF as a means of 
allowing Canada “to play a leading role in peace support operations” in 2006 (p. 73), highlighting 
its support for the joint UN-African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Darfur in 2008 (p. 58) 
and promising a return to peacekeeping and the deployment of troops “where it’s clear that a 
mission is consistent with Canada’s interests, values and capabilities” in 2011 (p. 82-83, quoted 
from p. 82).  
The Conservative Party’s three electoral victories from 2006 to 2011 allowed it to 
implement its desired foreign policy shift. When Stephen Harper was elected Prime Minister in 
February 2006, Canada had 198 troops participating in nine UN peacekeeping missions around the 
world; in October 2015, his last full month in office, it had 18 in five missions. Throughout his 
three terms as Prime Minister, monthly troop contributions only exceeded 26 for the period of 
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June-October 2013, peaking at 56 (International Peace Institute, nd.). While the Harper 
government was criticized for minimizing parliamentary and public input in foreign policy 
(Schmitz 2014), and it has been forcibly argued by Paris (2014) that, with some exceptions, 
Canadians maintained their commitment to liberal internationalism despite the Harper 
government’s foreign policy changes, two facts are particularly pertinent. First, the foreign policy 
beliefs of Canadian voters are not monolithic, and those who identify as Conservative Party 
supporters hold demonstrably different views on a wide variety of topics tied to militarism and 
internationalism. Indeed, there was a strong correlation between these views and support for both 
the Conservative Party and Stephen Harper during his time as Prime Minister (Gravelle et al. 
2014). It thus should not be concluded that the foreign policy actions and stated principles of the 
Harper government lacked a certain degree of popular support among the Conservative Party’s 
successful electoral coalition.16 Second, as acknowledged above, voters who do not prioritize 
foreign policy in their electoral decisions fail to incentivize politicians’ behaviour by removing the 
potential electoral costs of unpopular foreign policy changes. Even if the Canadian public 
maintained a commitment to liberal internationalism throughout Stephen Harper’s time as Prime 
Minister, the failure to translate that commitment into electoral incentives precluded greater 
involvement in UN peacekeeping.  
The decline of UN peacekeeping under Stephen Harper is therefore easy to explain. Within 
the decision-making model outlined above, his government’s turn away from liberal 
internationalism and concerted efforts to reorient Canadian foreign policy around the use of force 
and co-operation with Western allies in the pursuit of narrowly defined values embodied a 
fundamental lack of commitment to peacekeeping as a public good in the international system. 
Voters did not punish or, to a certain degree, supported this shift, providing the Conservatives 
Party with little incentive to alter its course; in fact, to the extent that it mobilized certain members 
of the party’s electoral coalition, it had an incentive to pursue its foreign policy objectives. The 
ideological commitments and electoral politics of the Conservative Party are not, however, the 
sole cause of Canada’s declining involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. They may explain 
the specific reluctance of the Harper government to engage in peacekeeping, but they also reflect 
a broader set of pressures and incentives that define politicians’ decision-making processes. A 
change in government may change the form(s) that these pressures and incentives take, but, as the 
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experiences of the Harper government’s successor show, they remain an ever-present constraint 
on peacekeeping participation.  
 
Justin Trudeau and the Effects of Risk Aversion 
The election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party in October 2015 offered a symbolic return 
of liberal internationalism to Canadian foreign policy. Promising to restore Canada’s place in the 
world and to re-embrace the commitment to multilateralism and international institutions that the 
Harper government had abandoned, the party’s 2015 manifesto pledged to “recommit to 
supporting international peace operations with the United Nations”, “not only because of the help 
they provide to millions of people affected by conflicts, but also because they serve Canada’s 
interests.” (p. 69). The Conservative Party platform again omitted any reference to peacekeeping, 
focusing instead on combatting ‘jihadi terrorism’ and the international campaign against the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),17 protecting persecuted minorities, supporting Ukraine, 
asserting northern sovereignty and, more broadly, strengthening the military for the purposes of 
national security (p. 75-101). The Liberal Party’s stance on peacekeeping enjoyed apparent 
popular support: an Angus Reid Institute (2015) poll conducted shortly before the election found 
that 74% of respondents believed that the Canadian military “should be focused on peacekeeping” 
rather than “combat preparedness” (at 26%), although support for peacekeeping over combat was 
notably higher among Liberal (82%) and New Democrat (84%) voters than their Conservative 
counterparts (53%). Again, however, foreign policy was not highly prioritized by voters in 2015. 
According to a poll conducted by the CBC during the campaign, voters ranked foreign policy last 
out of 13 issues in the election in terms if importance, with only two percent of respondents 
identifying it as their top priority. The economy, at 36%, was by far the most prominent concern 
(CBC News 2015) as the country dealt with the effects of a recent recession and a large drop in oil 
prices, a reality that was reflected by the major parties’ campaign messaging.18 
The new Liberal government maintained its rhetorical support for peacekeeping following 
its election victory. It also quickly declared that Canada would be seeking a seat on the UN Security 
Council, adding an extra imperative to demonstrate its apparent desire to re-engage in 
peacekeeping. In August 2016, the Liberal government announced a pledge to commit $450 
million and up to 600 troops and 150 police officers to international peace operations over the next 
three years (Brewster 2016). Trudeau reiterated this commitment to re-engage in UN peacekeeping 
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operations in his speech before the General Assembly the following month (Prime Minister of 
Canada 2016). These plans, however, lacked the popular support that peacekeeping enjoyed when 
considered in abstract. A Forum Research poll conducted in October 2016 revealed that 56% of 
voters, including 68% of Liberals, 56% of New Democrats and 41% of Conservatives, supported 
the plan to send 600 troops to Africa; when informed that Canadian peacekeepers could come 
under fire, however, support fell to 44%. In November 2017, the Liberal government announced 
it would be willing to provide Canadian transport and combat helicopters, cargo planes, military 
trainers and as many as 200 ground troops to the UN for future peacekeeping missions, apparently 
scaling back its promises from the previous year (Brewster 2017a).  
The Liberal government delayed making concrete commitments despite repeated requests 
from the UN and key European allies, most notably for Canada to provide helicopters to support 
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), to 
offer a senior officer to lead the Mali mission and to undertake military training and police reform 
in the country (Brewster 2017b). Similar requests to participate in operations in the Central African 
Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Haiti, and to fill important leadership positions in Afghanistan, 
the CAR and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were also denied (Brewster 2017a, and 
Brewster 2017b). The demand for Canadian participation by the UN is unsurprising given that 
Canadian troops, many of whom speak French, are both well trained and well equipped, while 
Canada possesses advanced military hardware and lacks the colonial history in Africa of some 
European powers. Beyond its broader value of promoting regional stability and a wide range of 
human rights, MINUSMA offered Canada the opportunity to work with its close NATO allies, 
particularly France, on counter-terrorism operations in a region of growing strategic importance 
and to gain the support of African states in its bid for a Security Council seat Nevertheless, the 
Trudeau government continued to resist firm participation commitments.  
Canada’s dwindling peacekeeping contributions began to receive media attention in early 
2018 as the number of Canadian troops deployed in UN peacekeeping missions fell to a historic 
low point.19 In March, the Liberal government announced that it would send six helicopters and 
up to 250 troops to Mali as part of MINUSMA (Brewster 2018a), and eventually pledged a further 
ten soldiers to serve at the mission’s headquarters and 20 police officers to support both the UN 
and a European Union (EU) training mission (Brewster 2018b). With 15,425 personnel, including 
11,684 contingent troops, deployed in April 2018, Canada’s contribution would be relatively small 
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(United Nations Peacekeeping, nd.(b)), and the length of its engagement would be limited to one 
year (Dickson 2018). UN officials reportedly expressed concerns that the size of Canada’s 
helicopter contingent would be inadequate for the demands of the mission, but the government’s 
offer remained unchanged (Kent 2018). At the time the commitment was announced, none of the 
162 fatalities experienced by MINUSMA had resulted from the use of helicopters in combat 
(Brewster 2018a). Some of Canada’s allies reportedly expressed frustration that the Liberal 
government did not adequately explain to the Canadian public the necessity of the mission or that 
Canadian troops would be relatively safe compared to other participants (Berthiaume 2018b).  
Senior opposition figures in the Conservative Party were quick to highlight the dangers 
posed by the ongoing conflict in Mali and to criticize the announcement as politically motivated 
(Brewster 2018a). The potential risks of the Mali mission have also been a major focus of coverage 
in the Canadian press, which has frequently stressed the possibility of Canadian casualties and the 
uncertainty of the mission’s success.20 Such concerns have had an impact on public opinion. In a 
poll conducted by the Angus Reid Institute (2018), 41% of respondents agreed with the statement 
that the Mali mission “is too risky and Canada shouldn’t get involved”. Again, respondents were 
split along party lines as 59% of Conservative supporters expressed agreement in contrast to only 
29% of Liberal and 31% and New Democratic Party (NDP) voters. While 70% claimed to strongly 
agree or agree that Canadian peacekeeping is a personal source of pride, 54% agreed with the 
statement that “[u]ltimately, the situation in Mali is not Canada’s problem”.  
There are thus few signs that the Trudeau government will restore Canada to a place of 
prominence in UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, it has few reasons to do so. In contrast to their 
predecessors who declined commitment due to their foreign policy priorities and the absence of 
electoral incentives, politicians in the federal Liberal Party are constrained by risk aversion to the 
potential costs peacekeeping entails. This risk aversion arises from the disconnect among voters 
between the support for peacekeeping in general and the support for concrete peacekeeping 
missions, such as the mission in Mali, as the potential dangers of participation come to the fore. 
To limit risk and fulfill its campaign promise to re-engage in UN peacekeeping operations, the 
logical option for the Liberal government is to make a token commitment. This is the path that is 
has pursued by deploying a relatively small number of troops in limited roles for a short period of 
time in response to requests for greater engagement from the UN and its allies. According to the 
most recent figures from IPI, even if Canada fields its promised 250 troops and 10 mission 
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headquarters staff concurrently, it will only rise to 48th position on the list of troop contributing 
countries to UN peacekeeping missions, behind Western allies Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.21 While a token commitment may 
fall short of international demand, it nevertheless allows the Liberal Party to placate its voters with 
a symbolic return to liberal internationalism while minimizing, as far as possible, the risk of 
incurring casualties as a result of participation. It is this domestic audience that decision-makers 
must satisfy, and thus for whom peacekeeping policy is ultimately crafted. 
 
Conclusions: Overcoming Free Riding 
Canada’s declining participation in UN peacekeeping operations has created a classic free-
rider problem: while the country is willing to enjoy the benefits of UN peacekeeping as a public 
good, it is unwilling to bear the costs that the private supply of peacekeeping entails. The electoral 
incentives that politicians face make this problem particularly intractable. But can it be overcome? 
Canada has, of course, made large personnel commitments to UN peacekeeping missions in the 
past, suggesting that it might be possible for it to do so again. For this to happen, the incentives 
that elected officials face when deciding whether to participate in peacekeeping must change. 
Canadian voters, if they truly value peacekeeping as a source of national identity and a vehicle for 
their country to play a positive role on the global stage, must more effectively communicate these 
interests to politicians by rewarding those who make peacekeeping commitments and punishing 
those who do not. Peacekeeping is not a primary concern for most voters. If Canada is to again 
play a leading role in UN peacekeeping operations, it may need to become one.  
There are, however, reasons to believe that Canadian politicians will be reluctant to 
meaningfully re-engage in UN peacekeeping operations for the foreseeable future. The modern 
Conservative Party’s approach to foreign policy, while consciously breaking from the tradition of 
liberal internationalism, enjoys the support of a sizeable segment of the Canadian public that the 
party depends on for electoral support. The Liberal Party, conversely, maintains an official 
commitment to peacekeeping, but is reluctant to translate that commitment into concrete action. 
Its plans for future engagement will likely depend on the ultimate public response to the Mali 
mission, which will in turn depend on the mission’s perceived success and costs. If the mission 
comes to enjoy public support—or at least fails to attract popular opposition—the Liberal 
government may be more open to the possibility of further commitments, but its ultimate risk 
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aversion is unlikely to disappear. Other political parties may see their approach to peacekeeping 
shaped by different combinations of ideological commitments and electoral constraints, but none 
have yet managed to break the Liberal/Conservative duopoly on political power.22  
There is also the very real possibility that debates about Canada’s role in the world will 
come to take on a greater urgency, if indeed they have not already done so. As the liberal 
international order that has historically been so central to Canadian foreign policy increasingly 
comes under threat from populist movements in Western democracies and the rise of powers that 
are less committed to the status quo, Canada may have to play a greater role in maintaining 
international institutions than it has in the recent past. There are few greater responses to free riding 
than changing the costs of inaction. The Canadian public will just need to communicate to its 
elected representatives that liberal internationalism is worth upholding. 
 
1 The significance of peacekeeping in Canadian politics and public opinion is explored throughout this article. For a 
recent survey of Canadians’ views of their country’s role in the world, including their perceptions of peacekeeping, 
see Environics Institute (2018).  
2 This article specifically analyzes troop commitments to UN peacekeeping operations. Troop numbers are used rather 
than total personnel numbers given the central role that troops play in peacekeeping operations and the unique demands 
and risks involved in their deployment. The long-term trend of Canada’s declining participation also holds if total 
personnel numbers are used (International Peace Institute, nd.). UN peacekeeping operations are examined both 
because the UN remains the primary vehicle through which international peacekeeping operations take place and 
because multilateral missions outside the UN are often difficult to classify, even if they involve certain peacekeeping 
activities.  
3 For analyses of peacekeeping in the context of free riding and the private provision of public goods, see: Bove and 
Elia (2011), Gaibulloev et al. (2015), and Sandler (2017). 
4 While President Obama was measured in his criticism, he nevertheless expressed his frustration about allies’ apparent 
free riding in a major foreign policy interview in The Atlantic as he approached the end of his time in office (Goldberg 
2016). President Trump, in contrast, has made criticism of alleged free riders and the demand that allies increase 
defence spending a central pillar of his approach to foreign policy. See, for example: Davis (2018), and Tasker (2016). 
5 Crucial input is provided by the military and relevant government departments. Still, these decisions are ultimately 
made by politicians. 
6 For an exploration of military expenditures and Canadian foreign policy, see Leuprecht and Sokolsky (2015). 
7 The Almond-Lippmann consensus, which holds that public opinion is volatile, incoherent and largely irrelevant to 
foreign policy, has been extensively debated. See, for example, Holsti (1992). 
8 Principle-agent problems with asymmetric information are defining features of democratic elections. For classic 
treatments of principle-agent problems in political science literature, see: Banks (1990), and Barro (1973). 
9 The implications of the changing nature of UN missions, including the impact of peace enforcement mandates on 
troop commitments by Western states, is considered in Karlsrud (2015). 
10 Notable treatments of casualty tolerance in peacekeeping operations include: Bove and Elia (2011), and van der 
Meulen and Soeters (2005).   
11 Token commitment is an important yet often overlooked aspect of peacekeeping participation. See, for example, 
Coleman (2013). 
12 An excellent overview of Canadian foreign policy under Stephen Harper can be found in Carment and Landry eds. 
(2014).  
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13 See Harper and Day (2003). At the time, Harper and Day were, respectively, the leader and shadow foreign minister 
of the Canadian Alliance, then in official opposition. The Canadian Alliance merged with the Progressive Conservative 
Party to form the Conservative Party of Canada later that year.  
14 For the Harper government’s efforts to construct an alternative narrative of Canadian history that places militarism 
at the centre of national identity, see Frenette (2014). 
15 The sole reference to peacekeeping comes in the party’s 2011 manifesto, which asserts that “no one can predict 
when our brave men and women in uniform may be called upon – whether to support our allies and defend our 
country’s interests, to help keep the peace in troubled lands, or to rescue the victims of natural disasters at home and 
abroad.” (32). The separation of peacekeeping from supporting allies and defending national interests is particularly 
illustrative.  
16 Paris (2014) considers—and ultimately rejects—a version of this argument on p. 294-302.  
17 The name ‘ISIS’ is used here given its use in the Conservative Party platform and in Canadian politics more 
generally.  
18 The degree to which economic issues dominated party platforms is most evident in the Conservative Party’s 
manifesto, entitled “Protect Our Economy: Our Conservative Plan to Protect the Economy”. The word ‘economy’ 
appears on the cover six times alone. See Conservative Party of Canada (2015).  
19 See, for example: Berthiaume (2018a), Brewster (2018), and Keddie (2018). 
20 See, for example: Arsenault (2018), Chase (2018), Common (2018), Hansen (2018), Krayden (2018), and Smith 
(2018).  
21 Calculations by author based on figures for December 2017. See International Peace Institute (nd.).  
22 This duopoly includes the historic predecessors to the modern Conservative Party.   
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